{"id":411385,"date":"2024-10-20T05:44:56","date_gmt":"2024-10-20T05:44:56","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/product\/uncategorized\/bs-iso-iec-15408-32022-tc\/"},"modified":"2024-10-26T10:37:55","modified_gmt":"2024-10-26T10:37:55","slug":"bs-iso-iec-15408-32022-tc","status":"publish","type":"product","link":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/product\/publishers\/bsi\/bs-iso-iec-15408-32022-tc\/","title":{"rendered":"BS ISO\/IEC 15408-3:2022 – TC"},"content":{"rendered":"

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PDF Pages<\/th>\nPDF Title<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n
340<\/td>\nNational foreword <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
350<\/td>\nForeword <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
352<\/td>\nIntroduction <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
353<\/td>\n1 Scope
2 Normative references
3 Terms and definitions <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
357<\/td>\n4 Overview <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
358<\/td>\n5 Assurance paradigm
5.1 General
5.2 ISO\/IEC 15408 series approach
5.3 Assurance approach
5.3.1 General
5.3.2 Significance of vulnerabilities <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
359<\/td>\n5.3.3 Cause of vulnerabilities
5.3.4 ISO\/IEC 15408 series assurance
5.3.5 Assurance through evaluation <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
360<\/td>\n5.4 ISO\/IEC 15408 series evaluation assurance scale
6 Security assurance components
6.1 General
6.2 Assurance class structure
6.2.1 General
6.2.2 Class name
6.2.3 Class introduction <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
361<\/td>\n6.2.4 Assurance families
6.3 Assurance family structure
6.3.1 Family name
6.3.2 Objectives <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
362<\/td>\n6.3.3 Component levelling
6.3.4 Application notes
6.3.5 Assurance components
6.4 Assurance component structure
6.4.1 General <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
363<\/td>\n6.4.2 Component identification
6.4.3 Objectives
6.4.4 Application notes
6.4.5 Dependencies
6.4.6 Assurance elements <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
364<\/td>\n6.5 Assurance elements
6.6 Component taxonomy
7 Class APE: Protection Profile (PP) evaluation
7.1 General <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
365<\/td>\n7.2 PP introduction (APE_INT)
7.2.1 Objectives
7.2.2 APE_INT.1 PP introduction <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
366<\/td>\n7.3 Conformance claims (APE_CCL)
7.3.1 Objectives
7.3.2 APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
368<\/td>\n7.4 Security problem definition (APE_SPD)
7.4.1 Objectives
7.4.2 APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
7.5 Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
7.5.1 Objectives <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
369<\/td>\n7.5.2 Component levelling
7.5.3 APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
7.5.4 APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
370<\/td>\n7.6 Extended components definition (APE_ECD)
7.6.1 Objectives
7.6.2 APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
371<\/td>\n7.7 Security requirements (APE_REQ)
7.7.1 Objectives
7.7.2 Component levelling
7.7.3 APE_REQ.1 Direct rationale PP-Module security requirements <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
372<\/td>\n7.7.4 APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
374<\/td>\n8 Class ACE: Protection Profile Configuration evaluation
8.1 General
8.2 PP-Module introduction (ACE_INT)
8.2.1 Objectives
8.2.2 ACE_INT.1 PP-Module introduction <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
375<\/td>\n8.3 PP-Module conformance claims (ACE_CCL)
8.3.1 Objectives <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
376<\/td>\n8.3.2 ACE_CCL.1 PP-Module conformance claims <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
377<\/td>\n8.4 PP-Module security problem definition (ACE_SPD)
8.4.1 Objectives
8.4.2 ACE_SPD.1 PP-Module security problem definition <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
378<\/td>\n8.5 PP-Module security objectives (ACE_OBJ)
8.5.1 Objectives
8.5.2 Component levelling
8.5.3 ACE_OBJ.1 PP-Module security objectives for the operational environment <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
379<\/td>\n8.5.4 ACE_OBJ.2 PP-Module security objectives
8.6 PP-Module extended components definition (ACE_ECD)
8.6.1 Objectives <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
380<\/td>\n8.6.2 ACE_ECD.1 PP-Module extended components definition
8.7 PP-Module security requirements (ACE_REQ)
8.7.1 Objectives <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
381<\/td>\n8.7.2 Component levelling
8.7.3 ACE_REQ.1 PP-Module stated security requirements <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
382<\/td>\n8.7.4 ACE_REQ.2 PP-Module derived security requirements <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
383<\/td>\n8.8 PP-Module consistency (ACE_MCO)
8.8.1 Objectives
8.8.2 ACE_MCO.1 PP-Module consistency <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
384<\/td>\n8.9 PP-Configuration consistency (ACE_CCO)
8.9.1 Objectives <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
385<\/td>\n8.9.2 ACE_CCO.1 PP-Configuration consistency <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
388<\/td>\n9 Class ASE: Security Target (ST) evaluation
9.1 General
9.2 ST introduction (ASE_INT)
9.2.1 Objectives
9.2.2 ASE_INT.1 ST introduction <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
389<\/td>\n9.3 Conformance claims (ASE_CCL)
9.3.1 Objectives <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
390<\/td>\n9.3.2 ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
391<\/td>\n9.4 Security problem definition (ASE_SPD)
9.4.1 Objectives
9.4.2 ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
392<\/td>\n9.5 Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
9.5.1 Objectives
9.5.2 Component levelling
9.5.3 ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
393<\/td>\n9.5.4 ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
394<\/td>\n9.6 Extended components definition (ASE_ECD)
9.6.1 Objectives
9.6.2 ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
395<\/td>\n9.7 Security requirements (ASE_REQ)
9.7.1 Objectives
9.7.2 Component levelling
9.7.3 ASE_REQ.1 Direct rationale security requirements <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
396<\/td>\n9.7.4 ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
398<\/td>\n9.8 TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
9.8.1 Objectives
9.8.2 Component levelling
9.8.3 ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
9.8.4 ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design summary <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
399<\/td>\n9.9 Consistency of composite product Security Target (ASE_COMP)
9.9.1 Objectives
9.9.2 Component levelling
9.9.3 Application notes <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
400<\/td>\n9.9.4 ASE_COMP.1 Consistency of Security Target (ST) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
401<\/td>\n10 Class ADV: Development
10.1 General <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
405<\/td>\n10.2 Security Architecture (ADV_ARC)
10.2.1 Objectives <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
406<\/td>\n10.2.2 Component levelling
10.2.3 Application notes
10.2.4 ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
407<\/td>\n10.3 Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
10.3.1 Objectives <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
408<\/td>\n10.3.2 Component levelling
10.3.3 Application notes <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
410<\/td>\n10.3.4 ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
411<\/td>\n10.3.5 ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
412<\/td>\n10.3.6 ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
10.3.7 ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
413<\/td>\n10.3.8 ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error information <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
414<\/td>\n10.3.9 ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional formal specification <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
416<\/td>\n10.4 Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
10.4.1 Objectives
10.4.2 Component levelling
10.4.3 Application notes <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
417<\/td>\n10.4.4 ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
418<\/td>\n10.4.5 ADV_IMP.2 Complete mapping of the implementation representation of the TSF
10.5 TSF internals (ADV_INT)
10.5.1 Objectives
10.5.2 Component levelling <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
419<\/td>\n10.5.3 Application notes
10.5.4 ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
420<\/td>\n10.5.5 ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
421<\/td>\n10.5.6 ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
422<\/td>\n10.6 Security policy modelling (ADV_SPM)
10.6.1 Objectives
10.6.2 Component levelling
10.6.3 Application notes
10.6.4 ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
424<\/td>\n10.7 TOE design (ADV_TDS)
10.7.1 Objectives
10.7.2 Component levelling
10.7.3 Application notes <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
425<\/td>\n10.7.4 ADV_TDS.1 Basic design <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
426<\/td>\n10.7.5 ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
427<\/td>\n10.7.6 ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
429<\/td>\n10.7.7 ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
430<\/td>\n10.7.8 ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
431<\/td>\n10.7.9 ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-level design presentation <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
432<\/td>\n10.8 Composite design compliance (ADV_COMP)
10.8.1 Objectives
10.8.2 Component levelling
10.8.3 Application notes <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
433<\/td>\n10.8.4 ADV_COMP.1 Design compliance with the base component-related user guidance, ETR for composite evaluation and report of the base component evaluation authority <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
434<\/td>\n11 Class AGD: Guidance documents
11.1 General
11.2 Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE)
11.2.1 Objectives <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
435<\/td>\n11.2.2 Component levelling
11.2.3 Application notes
11.2.4 AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
436<\/td>\n11.3 Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE)
11.3.1 Objectives
11.3.2 Component levelling
11.3.3 Application notes <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
437<\/td>\n11.3.4 AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
12 Class ALC: Life-cycle support
12.1 General <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
438<\/td>\n12.2 CM capabilities (ALC_CMC)
12.2.1 Objectives <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
439<\/td>\n12.2.2 Component levelling
12.2.3 Application notes <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
440<\/td>\n12.2.4 ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
12.2.5 ALC_CMC.2 Use of the CM system <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
441<\/td>\n12.2.6 ALC_CMC.3 Authorization controls <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
443<\/td>\n12.2.7 ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
445<\/td>\n12.2.8 ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
448<\/td>\n12.3 CM scope (ALC_CMS)
12.3.1 Objectives
12.3.2 Component levelling <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
449<\/td>\n12.3.3 Application notes
12.3.4 ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
12.3.5 ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
450<\/td>\n12.3.6 ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
451<\/td>\n12.3.7 ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
452<\/td>\n12.3.8 ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
453<\/td>\n12.4 Delivery (ALC_DEL)
12.4.1 Objectives
12.4.2 Component levelling
12.4.3 Application notes
12.4.4 ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
454<\/td>\n12.5 Developer environment security (ALC_DVS)
12.5.1 Objectives
12.5.2 Component levelling
12.5.3 Application notes
12.5.4 ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security controls <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
455<\/td>\n12.5.5 ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security controls
12.6 Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
12.6.1 Objectives <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
456<\/td>\n12.6.2 Component levelling
12.6.3 Application notes
12.6.4 ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
457<\/td>\n12.6.5 ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
458<\/td>\n12.6.6 ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
459<\/td>\n12.7 Development Life-cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
12.7.1 Objectives <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
460<\/td>\n12.7.2 Component levelling
12.7.3 Application notes
12.7.4 ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle processes <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
461<\/td>\n12.7.5 ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
462<\/td>\n12.8 TOE Development Artefacts (ALC_TDA)
12.8.1 Objectives
12.8.2 Component levelling
12.8.3 Application notes <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
463<\/td>\n12.8.4 ALC_TDA.1 Uniquely identifying implementation representation <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
464<\/td>\n12.8.5 ALC_TDA.2 Matching CMS scope of implementation representation <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
467<\/td>\n12.8.6 ALC_TDA.3 Regenerate TOE with well-defined development tools <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
469<\/td>\n12.9 Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
12.9.1 Objectives
12.9.2 Component levelling
12.9.3 Application notes <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
470<\/td>\n12.9.4 ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
12.9.5 ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
471<\/td>\n12.9.6 ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards – all parts <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
472<\/td>\n12.10 Integration of composition parts and consistency check of delivery procedures (ALC_COMP)
12.10.1 Objectives
12.10.2 Component levelling
12.10.3 Application notes <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
473<\/td>\n12.10.4 ALC_COMP.1 Integration of the dependent component into the related base component and Consistency check for delivery and acceptance procedures
13 Class ATE: Tests
13.1 General <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
474<\/td>\n13.2 Coverage (ATE_COV)
13.2.1 Objectives
13.2.2 Component levelling
13.2.3 Application notes
13.2.4 ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
475<\/td>\n13.2.5 ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
476<\/td>\n13.2.6 ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
13.3 Depth (ATE_DPT)
13.3.1 Objectives <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
477<\/td>\n13.3.2 Component levelling
13.3.3 Application notes
13.3.4 ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
478<\/td>\n13.3.5 ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
13.3.6 ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
479<\/td>\n13.3.7 ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
480<\/td>\n13.4 Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
13.4.1 Objectives
13.4.2 Component levelling
13.4.3 Application notes
13.4.4 ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
481<\/td>\n13.4.5 ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
482<\/td>\n13.5 Independent testing (ATE_IND)
13.5.1 Objectives
13.5.2 Component levelling
13.5.3 Application notes <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
483<\/td>\n13.5.4 ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
484<\/td>\n13.5.5 ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
485<\/td>\n13.5.6 ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
486<\/td>\n13.6 Composite functional testing (ATE_COMP)
13.6.1 Objectives
13.6.2 Component levelling
13.6.3 Application notes
13.6.4 ATE_COMP.1 Composite product functional testing <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
487<\/td>\n14 Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment
14.1 General
14.2 Application notes <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
488<\/td>\n14.3 Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN)
14.3.1 Objectives
14.3.2 Component levelling
14.3.3 AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
489<\/td>\n14.3.4 AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
490<\/td>\n14.3.5 AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
491<\/td>\n14.3.6 AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
492<\/td>\n14.3.7 AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
493<\/td>\n14.4 Composite vulnerability assessment (AVA_COMP)
14.4.1 Objectives
14.4.2 Component levelling <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
494<\/td>\n14.4.3 Application notes
14.4.4 AVA_COMP.1 Composite product vulnerability assessment <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
495<\/td>\n15 Class ACO: Composition
15.1 General <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
498<\/td>\n15.2 Composition rationale (ACO_COR)
15.2.1 Objectives
15.2.2 Component levelling
15.2.3 ACO_COR.1 Composition rationale
15.3 Development evidence (ACO_DEV)
15.3.1 Objectives
15.3.2 Component levelling
15.3.3 Application notes <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
499<\/td>\n15.3.4 ACO_DEV.1 Functional Description <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
500<\/td>\n15.3.5 ACO_DEV.2 Basic evidence of design
15.3.6 ACO_DEV.3 Detailed evidence of design <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
501<\/td>\n15.4 Reliance of dependent component (ACO_REL)
15.4.1 Objectives <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
502<\/td>\n15.4.2 Component levelling
15.4.3 Application notes
15.4.4 ACO_REL.1 Basic reliance information
15.4.5 ACO_REL.2 Reliance information <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
503<\/td>\n15.5 Composed TOE testing (ACO_CTT)
15.5.1 Objectives
15.5.2 Component levelling
15.5.3 Application notes <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
504<\/td>\n15.5.4 ACO_CTT.1 Interface testing <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
505<\/td>\n15.5.5 ACO_CTT.2 Rigorous interface testing <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
506<\/td>\n15.6 Composition vulnerability analysis (ACO_VUL)
15.6.1 Objectives
15.6.2 Component levelling
15.6.3 Application notes <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
507<\/td>\n15.6.4 ACO_VUL.1 Composition vulnerability review
15.6.5 ACO_VUL.2 Composition vulnerability analysis <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
508<\/td>\n15.6.6 ACO_VUL.3 Enhanced-Basic Composition vulnerability analysis <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
510<\/td>\nAnnex A (informative) Development (ADV) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
530<\/td>\nAnnex B (informative) Composition (ACO) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
537<\/td>\nAnnex C (informative) Cross reference of assurance component dependencies <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
541<\/td>\nBibliography <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Tracked Changes. Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection. Evaluation criteria for IT security – – Part 3. Security assurance components<\/b><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n
Published By<\/td>\nPublication Date<\/td>\nNumber of Pages<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
BSI<\/b><\/a><\/td>\n2022<\/td>\n542<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":411394,"template":"","meta":{"rank_math_lock_modified_date":false,"ep_exclude_from_search":false},"product_cat":[2641],"product_tag":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-411385","1":"product","2":"type-product","3":"status-publish","4":"has-post-thumbnail","6":"product_cat-bsi","8":"first","9":"instock","10":"sold-individually","11":"shipping-taxable","12":"purchasable","13":"product-type-simple"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/product\/411385","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/product"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/product"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/411394"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=411385"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"product_cat","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/product_cat?post=411385"},{"taxonomy":"product_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/product_tag?post=411385"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}