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BS EN 419211-4:2013

BS EN 419211-4:2013

$142.49

Protection profiles for secure signature creation device – Extension for device with key generation and trusted channel to certificate generation application

Published By Publication Date Number of Pages
BSI 2013 30
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This European Standard specifies a protection profile for a secure signature creation device that may generate signing keys internally and export the public key in protected manner: secure signature creation device with key generation and trusted communication with certificate generation application (SSCD KG TCCGA).

PDF Catalog

PDF Pages PDF Title
4 Contents Page
5 Foreword
6 Introduction
7 1 Scope
2 Normative references
3 Conventions and terminology
3.1 Conventions
3.2 Terms and definitions
4 PP introduction
4.1 PP reference
8 4.2 PP overview
4.3 TOE overview
4.3.1 Operation of the TOE
9 4.3.2 Target of evaluation
10 4.3.3 TOE lifecycle
11 5 Conformance claims
5.1 CC conformance claim
5.2 PP claim, Package claim
5.3 Conformance rationale
12 5.4 Conformance statement
6 Security problem definition
6.1 Assets, users and threat agents
6.2 Threats
13 6.3 Organizational security policies
6.4 Assumptions
7 Security objectives
7.1 Security objectives for the TOE
7.1.1 Relation to core PP SSCD KG
7.1.2 OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth Authentication proof as SSCD
7.1.3 OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp TOE trusted channel for SVD export
7.2 Security objectives for the operational environment
7.2.1 Relation to core PP SSCD KG
7.2.2 OE.Dev_Prov_Service Authentic SSCD provided by SSCD Provisioning Service
14 7.2.3 OE.CGA_SSCD_Auth Pre-initialization of the TOE for SSCD authentication
7.2.4 OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp CGA trusted channel for SVD import
7.3 Security objectives rationale
7.3.1 Security objectives backtracking
15 Table 1 ā€” Mapping of security problem definition to security objectives
16 7.3.2 Security objectives sufficiency
17 8 Extended components definition
8.1 Definition of the family FPT_EMS
8.2 Definition of the family FIA_API
Figure 1 – Component levelling FIA_API Authentification Proof of Identity
18 9 Security requirements
9.1 Security functional requirements
9.1.1 Use of requirement specifications
19 9.1.2 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
9.1.3 FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
9.1.4 FIA_API.1 FDP_DAU.2/SVD Data Authentication with Identity of Guarantor
20 9.1.5 FIA_API.1 FTP_ITC.1/SVD Inter-TSF trusted channel
9.2 Security assurance requirements
Table 2 ā€” Assurance requirements: EAL4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5
21 9.3 Security requirements rationale
9.3.1 Security requirement coverage
Table 3 ā€” Mapping of functional requirements to security objectives for the TOE
23 9.3.2 TOE Security requirements sufficiency
24 9.3.3 Satisfaction of dependencies of security requirements
Table 4 ā€” Satisfaction of dependencies of security functional requirements
26 Table 5 ā€” Satisfaction of dependencies of security assurance requirements
9.3.4 Rationale for chosen security assurance requirements
27 Bibliography

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BS EN 419211-4:2013
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