BS EN 61131-6:2012:2013 Edition
$215.11
Programmable controllers – Functional safety
| Published By | Publication Date | Number of Pages |
| BSI | 2013 | 100 |
IEC 61131-6:2012 specifies requirements for programmable controllers (PLCs) and their associated peripherals, as defined in Part 1, which are intended to be used as the logic subsystem of an electrical/electronic/programmable electronic (E/E/PE) safety-related system. A programmable controller and its associated peripherals complying with the requirements of this part is considered suitable for use in an E/E/PE safety-related system and is identified as a functional safety programmable logic controller (FS-PLC). An FS-PLC is generally a hardware (HW) / software (SW) subsystem. An FS-PLC may also include software elements, for example predefined function blocks.
PDF Catalog
| PDF Pages | PDF Title |
|---|---|
| 8 | English CONTENTS |
| 13 | Figures Figure 1 – FS-PLC in the overall E/E/PE safety-related system safety lifecycle phases |
| 14 | 1 Scope |
| 15 | 2 Normative references |
| 16 | 3 Terms and definitions |
| 20 | Figure 2 – Failure model |
| 29 | 4 Conformance to this standard 5 FS-PLC safety lifecycle 5.1 General |
| 30 | Figure 3 – FS-PLC safety lifecycle (in realization phase) |
| 31 | 5.2 FS-PLC functional safety SIL capability requirements 5.2.1 General |
| 32 | 5.2.2 Data security 5.3 Quality management system |
| 33 | 5.4 Management of FS-PLC safety lifecycle 5.4.1 Objectives 5.4.2 Requirements and procedures |
| 37 | 5.4.3 Execution and monitoring 5.4.4 Management of functional safety 6 FS-PLC design requirements specification 6.1 General |
| 38 | 6.2 Design requirements specification contents |
| 39 | 6.3 Target failure rate Figure 4 – Relevant parts of a safety function Tables Table 1 – Safety integrity levels for low demand mode of operation |
| 40 | 7 FS-PLC design, development and validation plan 7.1 General 7.2 Segmenting requirements Table 2 – Safety integrity levels for high demand or continuous mode of operation |
| 41 | 8 FS-PLC architecture 8.1 General Figure 5 – FS-PLC to engineering tools relationship |
| 42 | 8.2 Architectures and subsystems 8.3 Data communication 9 HW design, development and validation planning 9.1 HW general requirements 9.2 HW functional safety requirements specification 9.3 HW safety validation planning |
| 43 | 9.4 HW design and development 9.4.1 General 9.4.2 Requirements for FS-PLC behaviour on detection of a fault |
| 44 | 9.4.3 HW safety integrity Table 3 – Faults to be detected and notified (alarmed) to the application program |
| 45 | Table 4 – Hardware safety integrity – low complexity (type A) subsystem Table 5 – Hardware safety integrity – high complexity (type B) subsystem |
| 47 | Figure 6 – HW subsystem decomposition |
| 49 | Figure 7 – Example: determination of the maximum SIL for specified architecture |
| 51 | Figure 8 – Example of limitation on hardware safety integrityfor a multiple-channel safety function |
| 52 | 9.4.4 Random HW failures |
| 54 | Table 6 – Faults or failures to be assumed when quantifying the effect of random hardware failures or to be taken into account in the derivation of safe failure fraction |
| 57 | 9.4.5 HW requirements for the avoidance of systematic failures 9.4.6 HW requirements for the control of systematic faults |
| 58 | 9.4.7 HW classification of faults Figure 9 – Fault classification and FS-PLC behaviour |
| 59 | 9.4.8 HW implementation |
| 60 | 9.4.9 De-rating of components 9.4.10 ASIC design and development 9.4.11 Techniques and measures to prevent the introduction of faults in ASICs 9.5 HW and embedded SW and FS-PLC integration Figure 10 – ASIC development lifecycle (V-Model) |
| 61 | 9.6 HW operation and maintenance procedures 9.6.1 Objective 9.6.2 Requirements |
| 62 | 9.7 HW safety validation 9.7.1 General 9.7.2 Requirements |
| 63 | 9.8 HW verification 9.8.1 Objective 9.8.2 Requirements |
| 64 | 10 FS-PLC SW design and development 10.1 General Figure 11 – Model of FS-PLC and engineering tools layers |
| 65 | 10.2 Requirements 10.3 Classification of engineering tools Table 7 – Examples of tool classification |
| 66 | 10.4 SW safety validation planning 11 FS-PLC safety validation 12 FS-PLC type tests 12.1 General 12.2 Type test requirements |
| 68 | Table 8 – Performance criteria |
| 69 | 12.3 Climatic test requirements 12.4 Mechanical test requirements 12.5 EMC test requirements 12.5.1 General 12.5.2 General EMC environment |
| 70 | Table 9 – Immunity test levels for enclosure port tests in general EMC environment |
| 71 | 12.5.3 Specified EMC environment Table 10 – Immunity test levels in general EMC environment |
| 72 | Table 11 – Immunity test levels for enclosure port tests in specified EMC environment |
| 73 | 13 FS-PLC verification 13.1 Verification plan Table 12 – Immunity test levels in specified EMC environment |
| 74 | 13.2 Fault insertion test requirements |
| 75 | 13.3 As qualified versus as shipped 14 Functional safety assessment 14.1 Objective Table 13 – Fault tolerance test, required effectiveness |
| 76 | 14.2 Assessment requirements 14.2.1 Assessment evidence and documentation 14.2.2 Assessment method |
| 78 | 14.3 FS-PLC assessment information 14.4 Independence Table 14 – Functional safety assessment Information |
| 79 | 15 FS-PLC operation, maintenance and modification procedures 15.1 Objective 15.2 FS-PLC modification Table 15 – Minimum levels of independence ofthose carrying out functional safety assessment |
| 80 | 16 Information to be provided by the FS-PLC manufacturer for the user 16.1 General 16.2 Information on conformance to this standard 16.3 Information on type and content of documentation 16.4 Information on catalogues and/or datasheets 16.5 Safety manual 16.5.1 General 16.5.2 Safety manual contents |
| 83 | Annex A (informative) Reliability calculations |
| 84 | Annex B (informative) Typical FS-PLC Architectures |
| 85 | Figure B.1 – Single FS-PLC with single I/O and external watchdog (1oo1D) Figure B.2 – Dual PE with single I/O and external watchdogs (1oo1D) |
| 86 | Figure B.3 – Dual PE with dual I/O, no inter-processor communication,and 1oo2 shutdown logic |
| 87 | Figure B.4 – Dual PE with dual I/O, inter-processor communication,and 1oo2D shutdown logic Figure B.5 – Dual PE with dual I/O, no inter-processor communication,external watchdogs, and 2oo2 shutdown logic |
| 88 | Figure B.6 – Dual PE with dual I/O, inter-processor communication,external watchdogs, and 2oo2D shutdown logic |
| 89 | Figure B.7 – Triple PE with triple I/O, inter-processor communication,and 2oo3D shutdown logic |
| 90 | Annex C (informative) Energise to trip applications of FS-PLC |
| 92 | Annex D (informative) Available failure rate databases |
| 94 | Annex E (informative) Methodology for the estimation of common cause failure rates in a multiple channel FS-PLC Table E.1 – Criteria for estimation of common cause failure |
| 95 | Table E.2 – Estimation of common cause failure factor |
| 96 | Bibliography |
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