BS IEC 61000-5-6:2024 – TC
$280.87
Tracked Changes. Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) – Installation and mitigation guidelines. Mitigation of external EM influences
Published By | Publication Date | Number of Pages |
BSI | 2024 | 181 |
PDF Catalog
PDF Pages | PDF Title |
---|---|
105 | undefined |
107 | CONTENTS |
111 | FOREWORD |
113 | INTRODUCTION |
114 | 1 Scope 2 Normative references 3 Terms, definitions and abbreviated terms 3.1 Terms and definitions |
119 | 3.2 Abbreviated terms 4 Overview and general considerations 4.1 Overview |
120 | 4.2 General considerations 4.2.1 Elementary interference control 4.2.2 Shields and interfaces Figures Figure 1 – System barrier topology |
122 | 5 Mitigation of radiated and conducted disturbances 5.1 Topological concepts Figure 2 – Generalized system topology |
123 | 5.2 Mitigation needs 5.3 The general concept of enclosure |
124 | 5.4 Interactions at the enclosure boundary 6 Shielding 6.1 General Figure 3 – Ports of an apparatus or facility |
125 | Figure 4 – Topological concept of shields with interfaces at penetration points |
126 | 6.2 Classification of protection zones 6.2.1 General Figure 5 – Zones of protection of shielding and earthing systems |
127 | 6.2.2 Zone 1 – Building shield 6.2.3 Zone 2 – Room shield 6.2.4 Zone 3 – Equipment shield 6.2.5 Zone 4 – Apparatus shield 6.3 Design principles for screening 6.3.1 General |
128 | 6.3.2 Shielding effectiveness 6.3.3 Maintaining shielding effectiveness |
130 | 6.4 Implementation of screening 6.4.1 General 6.4.2 Sensitive apparatus 6.4.3 Shielding of racks and chassis (zones 4/3 barrier) 6.4.4 Shielding of cabinets (zones 3/2 barrier) 6.4.5 Shielding of rooms (zones 2/1 barrier) |
131 | 6.4.6 Shielding of buildings (zones 1/0 barrier) Figure 6 – Example of performance of high-efficiency shielded enclosure Tables Table 1 – Measured shielding effectiveness of a 2 m × 2 m cage madeof concrete building armour, against a 20 ns rise-time pulse(equivalent frequency less than 20 MHz) |
132 | 6.4.7 Dealing with apertures Figure 7 – Honeycomb inserts for different cut-off frequencies |
133 | Figure 8 – Typical screening attenuation of honeycomb inserts |
134 | 7 Filters 7.1 General |
135 | 7.2 Fundamental filter characteristics 7.2.1 General 7.2.2 Attenuation and insertion loss Figure 9 – Parameters for attenuation and insertion loss |
136 | 7.2.3 Basic types of filters |
137 | 7.3 Functional tasks Figure 10 – Prevention of interference on installed equipment Figure 11 – Reduction of electromagnetic disturbancesin the power network and the environment |
138 | 7.4 Additional filtering concerns 7.4.1 Technical aspects 7.4.2 Economic aspects |
139 | 7.5 Selection criteria 7.5.1 General 7.5.2 Voltage rating 7.5.3 Current rating 7.5.4 Duty-cycle and overload operating conditions |
140 | 7.5.5 Operating frequency and range of frequencies to be filtered 7.5.6 Voltage drop and signal loss 7.5.7 Ambient temperature range 7.5.8 Insertion loss and attenuation |
141 | 7.5.9 Withstand voltage 7.5.10 Attenuation of HF transient disturbances 7.5.11 Leakage current to protective earthing conductor Figure 12 – Examples of insertion loss characteristics of AC/DC power port filters |
142 | 7.5.12 Permissible reactive current 7.6 Filter installation 7.6.1 General 7.6.2 Installation and mounting techniques |
143 | 7.6.3 Wiring 7.6.4 Installation of cabinet filters Figure 13 – Mounting of filters Figure 14 – Connection of screened cables |
144 | 7.7 Filter testing 7.7.1 General considerations Figure 15 – Example of integration of filters inside an equipment cabinet Figure 16 – Example of filter mounting in a dedicated unit |
145 | 7.7.2 Insulation to earth and withstand voltage of installed filters 7.7.3 Insertion loss 7.7.4 Attenuation of HF transient disturbances |
146 | 8 Decoupling devices 8.1 Isolation transformers Figure 17 – Laboratory measurement showing the propagation of a 0,5 μs to 100 kHz ring wave, applied in differential mode, through an ordinary isolation transformer |
147 | Figure 18 – Propagation of a 0,5 μs to 100 kHz ring wave operatingin the differential mode through a “line isolator” transformer Figure 19 – Inter-winding coupling in an isolation transformer |
148 | 8.2 Motor-generator sets 8.3 Engine generators 8.4 Uninterruptible power supply (UPS) |
149 | 8.5 Optical links 9 Surge-protective devices 9.1 General |
150 | 9.2 Direct equipment protection |
151 | 9.3 Installation of multiple SPDs |
152 | 9.4 Side-effects of uncoordinated cascades 9.5 Typical protective devices 9.5.1 General 9.5.2 Voltage-limiting type SPDs 9.5.3 Voltage-switching type SPDs |
153 | Annex A (informative)Resilience-based approach for the mitigation ofexternal high-power electromagnetic environments A.1 Overview A.2 The concept of resilience A.2.1 General |
154 | A.2.2 Discussion on the protection-led approach Figure A.1 – Protection-led approach Figure A.2 – Resilience-based approach |
155 | A.2.3 Benefits of a resilience-based approach A.2.4 Affordability and risk Table A.1 – Protection levels based on operational criticality |
156 | A.2.5 Appropriate application of a resilience-based approach Table A.2 – Appropriate application of the resilience-based approach |
157 | A.3 EM resilience model and framework A.3.1 General A.3.2 Identify function A.3.3 Protect function Figure A.3 – The five functions of the NIST cyber security framework |
158 | A.3.4 Detect function A.3.5 Respond function A.3.6 Recover function A.3.7 Adaptation of the NIST framework to HPEM resilience A.4 HPEM resilience framework implementation A.4.1 Overview A.4.2 Identify |
159 | Table A.3 – Identify function of the HPEM resilience framework |
160 | A.4.3 Protect |
161 | Table A.4 – Protect function of the HPEM resilience framework |
163 | Figure A.4 – Protection scheme utilising shielded cables and shielded cabinets |
165 | A.4.4 Detect Table A.5 – Detect function of the HPEM resilience framework |
168 | Table A.6 – Some advantages and limitations of different technologiesfor HPEM detection applications |
170 | Figure A.5 – IEMI detector developed by Fraunhofer INT, Germany |
171 | Figure A.6 – TOTEM detector developed by QinetiQ ltd., UK |
172 | Figure A.7 – Example of some HPEM events detected during a field-trial installation |
173 | A.4.5 Respond Table A.7 – Respond function of the HPEM resilience framework |
174 | A.4.6 Recover A.5 Summary Table A.8 – Recover function of the HPEM resilience framework |
175 | Bibliography |