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BSI PD IEC TR 63415:2023

BSI PD IEC TR 63415:2023

$198.66

Nuclear Power plants. Instrumentation and control systems. Use of formal security models for I&C security architecture design and assessment

Published By Publication Date Number of Pages
BSI 2023 60
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PDF Catalog

PDF Pages PDF Title
2 undefined
4 CONTENTS
7 FOREWORD
9 INTRODUCTION
11 1 Scope
12 2 Normative references
3 Terms and definitions
14 4 Abbreviated terms
15 5 I&C system security life cycle and security modelling activities
Tables
Table 1 – I&C life cycle stages and corresponding scenarios for the use of security modelling
17 6 Description of a typical NPP I&C system
18 7 Security requirements and security architecture
7.1 General framework
Figures
Figure 1 – Structure of a typical I&C system
20 7.2 Integrated security model
7.3 Basics of the information exchange model (DM)
7.4 Basics of the security model (SLM)
21 7.5 Basic principles of the secure design
7.6 Asset ranking and ordering
7.7 Information property of the asset
22 7.8 Security degrees concept and security architecture
23 7.9 Establishing a relation between the data model and the security model
8 Procedure of I&C security modelling
8.1 General
25 Figure 2 – Procedure of security architecture synthesis
26 8.2 General approach to asset classification
8.3 Security degree assignment and the analysis of model conformance
8.4 Classification in hierarchical systems
27 Figure 3 – I&C information model with subsystem hierarchy (left) and without it (right)
28 9 Case study of I&C security architecture synthesis
9.1 General
9.2 Definition of the security model
29 9.3 Selecting the detail level in system analysis
9.4 Asset classification
Figure 4 – Simplified information model of security. (secure relation between degrees are shown by dashed lines)
30 9.5 Identification and initial classification of assets
9.6 Data model
Table 2 – List of assets of a typical control system channel and IS target characteristics
31 9.7 Analysis of the model and synthesis of architecture
Figure 5 – General security graph for I&C subsystem without taking into account security controls. The borders show boundaries for workstation server and gate subsystem.
32 Figure 6 – Changes in the security graph for I&C subsystem when OS_WS asset is targeting allocation to a separate zone. The edges belonging to the minimal cut are shown with bold lines.
33 Figure 7 – General view of the security graph for I&C subsystem, taking into account security controls for OS assets. The security degree structure is shown in a) and the zone structure is shown in b). Degrees and zones are shown in a solid rectangle. The degree is numbered.
34 Figure 8 – Changes in the security graph for I&C subsystem when server assets are targeting allocation to a separate zone from the workstation. The edges belonging to minimal cut are highlighted with bold line.
35 9.8 Assessment of the modified security architecture
Figure 9 – General representation of the security graph for practical I&C subsystem, taking into account all assigned security controls for the assets. The security degree structure is shown in a) and zone structure is shown in b). The degrees and zones are shown in solid rectangle. The degrees are numbered.
36 10 NPP cybersecurity simulation for security assessment of I&C systems
Table 3 – Information security characteristics for assets in the architecture of a I&C subsystem
37 11 Conclusion
Figure 10 – General scenario of use of the digital twin for stress tests
39 Annexes
Annex A (informative)Data model
Table A.1 – Correspondence of the physical properties of I&C systems with the properties of the security graph
42 Annex B (informative) Security model definition (SLM)
43 Annex C (informative) Justification of the secure by design principle
45 Annex D (informative) Mapping of security and data model
Figure D.1 – Sketch of link transformation
46 Figure D.2 – Example of domains of connectivity in a graph – Here the graph splits into three domains
48 Annex E (informative) Formal approach to asset clustering and classification
E.1 Input data types and the choice of data representation for the analysis
E.2 Order relation on a security graph
Table E.1 – NPP I&C asset properties
49 E.3 Data renormalization
E.4 Criteria and clustering method
51 Annex F (informative) Some algorithmic aspects for security architecture synthesis
Table F.1 – Computational methods for analyzing the security graph
52 Annex G (informative) Asset classification using clustering method: an example
Figure G.1 – Security graph of the system in the information exchange model
Table G.1 – Table of attributes
53 Figure G.2 – Transitive closure of the security graph by the relation w
Figure G.3 – Asset partitioning by security degrees
54 Table G.2 – Partition of the assets into security degrees
55 Annex H (informative) Mathematical notations in the integrated security mode
H.1 Integrated cybersecurity model, ICM
H.2 Model of information exchange, DM
H.3 Allowed transformation of a security graph
H.4 Relationship of secure information transfer between two assets
H.5 Relationship of simple information transfer between two assets
H.6 Asymmetric operations between two assets
H.7 Access rules model
56 H.8 Relationship of simple information transfer between security degrees
H.9 Relationship of secure information transfer between security degrees
H.10 Operator R of mapping between two models
57 Bibliography

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BSI PD IEC TR 63415:2023
$198.66