{"id":422100,"date":"2024-10-20T06:39:36","date_gmt":"2024-10-20T06:39:36","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/product\/uncategorized\/bsi-pd-iec-ts-632082020-2\/"},"modified":"2024-10-26T12:27:43","modified_gmt":"2024-10-26T12:27:43","slug":"bsi-pd-iec-ts-632082020-2","status":"publish","type":"product","link":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/product\/publishers\/bsi\/bsi-pd-iec-ts-632082020-2\/","title":{"rendered":"BSI PD IEC TS 63208:2020"},"content":{"rendered":"
This document applies to the security related main functions of switchgear and controlgear during the whole lifecycle of the equipment. It is applicable to wired and wireless data communication means and the physical accessibility to the equipment, within its limits of environmental conditions.<\/p>\n
This document is intended to develop awareness about security aspects and provides recommendations and requirements on the appropriate countermeasures against vulnerability to threats.<\/p>\n
In particular, it focuses on potential vulnerabilities to threats resulting in:<\/p>\n
unintended operation of the switching device or the control device or sensor, which can lead to hazardous situations;<\/p>\n<\/li>\n
unavailability of the protective functions (overcurrent, earth leakage, etc.).<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
This document does not cover security requirement for information technology (IT) and for industrial automation and control systems (IACS), but it only implements in switchgear and controlgear appropriate security countermeasures derived from the base security publication ISO\/IEC 27001 and the group security publications IEC 62443 (all parts).<\/p>\n
This document, as a product security publication, follows IEC Guide 120 and includes typical use case studies as given in Annex B.<\/p>\n
PDF Pages<\/th>\n | PDF Title<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
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2<\/td>\n | undefined <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
4<\/td>\n | CONTENTS <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
7<\/td>\n | FOREWORD <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
9<\/td>\n | INTRODUCTION <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
10<\/td>\n | 1 Scope 2 Normative references <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
11<\/td>\n | 3 Terms, definitions and abbreviated terms 3.1 Terms and definitions <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
14<\/td>\n | 3.2 Abbreviated terms <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
15<\/td>\n | 4 General 5 Security objectives 6 Security lifecycle management 6.1 General <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
16<\/td>\n | 6.2 Security risk assessment Figure 1 \u2013 Example of physical interfaces of an embedded devicein an equipment which can be subject to an attack Table 1 \u2013 Typical threats <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
17<\/td>\n | 6.3 Response to security risk Figures <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
18<\/td>\n | 6.4 Security requirement specification 6.5 Important data 6.6 System architecture 6.6.1 Control system 6.6.2 Levels of communication functionalities <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
19<\/td>\n | 6.6.3 Levels of connectivity Figure 2 \u2013 Control system architecture with switchgear and controlgear <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
20<\/td>\n | Figure 3 \u2013 Control system connectivity level C3 Figure 4 \u2013 Control system connectivity level C4 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
21<\/td>\n | 6.6.4 Control system exposure levels Figure 5 \u2013 Control system connectivity level C5 Table 2 \u2013 Level of exposure of a control system <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
22<\/td>\n | 7 Security requirements 7.1 General 7.2 Cybersecurity aspects Figure 6 \u2013 Switchgear and controlgear minimum security profile <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
23<\/td>\n | 7.3 Physical access and environment <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
24<\/td>\n | 7.4 Equipment requirement 7.4.1 General 7.4.2 Hardening 7.4.3 Encryption techniques 7.4.4 Embedded software robustness and integrity <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
25<\/td>\n | 7.4.5 Denial of service 7.4.6 Authentication of users <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
26<\/td>\n | 7.4.7 Communication systems 7.4.8 Wireless communication 8 Instructions for installation, operation and maintenance <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
27<\/td>\n | 9 Development and testing 9.1 General development method 9.2 Testing Figure 7 \u2013 Example of security instruction symbol <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
28<\/td>\n | Annex A (informative)Cybersecurity and electrical system architecture A.1 General A.2 Typical architecture involving switchgear and controlgear and their assembly A.2.1 Building <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
29<\/td>\n | A.2.2 Manufacturing Figure A.1 \u2013 Building electrical architecture <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
30<\/td>\n | A.3 Security levels and product standards Figure A.2 \u2013 Industrial plants <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
31<\/td>\n | Annex B (informative)Use case studies B.1 General B.2 Use case 1 \u2013 Protection against malicious firmware upgrade of a circuit-breaker <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
32<\/td>\n | B.3 Use case 2 \u2013 Protection against unauthorized access to electrical production network <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
33<\/td>\n | B.4 Use case 3 \u2013 Protection against DDoS (distributed denial of service) attack through insecure IoT devices <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
34<\/td>\n | B.5 Use case 4 \u2013 Protection against unauthorized access to the electrical network using illegitimate device <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
36<\/td>\n | B.6 Use case 5 \u2013 Protection against malicious firmware upgrade of a sensor (e.g. proximity switch), mounted in a machine wired-connected by IO-Link interface <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
37<\/td>\n | B.7 Use case 6 \u2013 HMI: human machine interface \u2013 Protection against unauthorized access to a simple sensor (mounted in a machine) \u2013 improper parametrization <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
38<\/td>\n | B.8 Use case 7 \u2013 HMI: human machine interface \u2013 Protection against unauthorized access to a complex sensor (mounted in a machine) \u2013 improper parametrization <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
40<\/td>\n | B.9 Use case 8 \u2013 Protection against unauthorized access to a sensor (e.g. proximity switch), mounted in a machine, connected by wireless communication interface (WCI) <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
42<\/td>\n | Annex C (informative)Basic cybersecurity aspects C.1 General C.2 Identification and authentication C.3 Use control C.4 System integrity <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
43<\/td>\n | C.5 Data confidentiality C.6 Restricted data flow C.7 Timely response to events C.8 Resource availability <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
44<\/td>\n | Annex D (informative)Guidelines for users of switchgear and controlgear D.1 General D.2 Risk assessment and security planning D.2.1 Risk assessment D.2.2 Security plan <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
45<\/td>\n | D.3 Recommendations for design and installation of the system integrating switchgear and controlgear D.3.1 General access control D.3.2 Recommendations for local access <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
46<\/td>\n | D.3.3 Recommendations for remote access D.3.4 Recommendations for firmware upgrades <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
47<\/td>\n | Bibliography <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear. Security aspects<\/b><\/p>\n |