This European Standard specifies a protection profile for a secure signature creation device that may generate signing keys internally and export the public key in protected manner: secure signature creation device with key generation and trusted communication with certificate generation application (SSCD KG TCCGA).<\/p>\n
| PDF Pages<\/th>\n | PDF Title<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4<\/td>\n | Contents Page <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 5<\/td>\n | Foreword <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 6<\/td>\n | Introduction <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 7<\/td>\n | 1 Scope 2 Normative references 3 Conventions and terminology 3.1 Conventions 3.2 Terms and definitions 4 PP introduction 4.1 PP reference <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 8<\/td>\n | 4.2 PP overview 4.3 TOE overview 4.3.1 Operation of the TOE <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 9<\/td>\n | 4.3.2 Target of evaluation <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 10<\/td>\n | 4.3.3 TOE lifecycle <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 11<\/td>\n | 5 Conformance claims 5.1 CC conformance claim 5.2 PP claim, Package claim 5.3 Conformance rationale <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 12<\/td>\n | 5.4 Conformance statement 6 Security problem definition 6.1 Assets, users and threat agents 6.2 Threats <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 13<\/td>\n | 6.3 Organizational security policies 6.4 Assumptions 7 Security objectives 7.1 Security objectives for the TOE 7.1.1 Relation to core PP SSCD KG 7.1.2 OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth Authentication proof as SSCD 7.1.3 OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp TOE trusted channel for SVD export 7.2 Security objectives for the operational environment 7.2.1 Relation to core PP SSCD KG 7.2.2 OE.Dev_Prov_Service Authentic SSCD provided by SSCD Provisioning Service <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 14<\/td>\n | 7.2.3 OE.CGA_SSCD_Auth Pre-initialization of the TOE for SSCD authentication 7.2.4 OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp CGA trusted channel for SVD import 7.3 Security objectives rationale 7.3.1 Security objectives backtracking <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 15<\/td>\n | Table 1 \u2014 Mapping of security problem definition to security objectives <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 16<\/td>\n | 7.3.2 Security objectives sufficiency <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 17<\/td>\n | 8 Extended components definition 8.1 Definition of the family FPT_EMS 8.2 Definition of the family FIA_API Figure 1 – Component levelling FIA_API Authentification Proof of Identity <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 18<\/td>\n | 9 Security requirements 9.1 Security functional requirements 9.1.1 Use of requirement specifications <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 19<\/td>\n | 9.1.2 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication 9.1.3 FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity 9.1.4 FIA_API.1 FDP_DAU.2\/SVD Data Authentication with Identity of Guarantor <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 20<\/td>\n | 9.1.5 FIA_API.1 FTP_ITC.1\/SVD Inter-TSF trusted channel 9.2 Security assurance requirements Table 2 \u2014 Assurance requirements: EAL4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 21<\/td>\n | 9.3 Security requirements rationale 9.3.1 Security requirement coverage Table 3 \u2014 Mapping of functional requirements to security objectives for the TOE <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 23<\/td>\n | 9.3.2 TOE Security requirements sufficiency <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 24<\/td>\n | 9.3.3 Satisfaction of dependencies of security requirements Table 4 \u2014 Satisfaction of dependencies of security functional requirements <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 26<\/td>\n | Table 5 \u2014 Satisfaction of dependencies of security assurance requirements 9.3.4 Rationale for chosen security assurance requirements <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 27<\/td>\n | Bibliography <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Protection profiles for secure signature creation device – Extension for device with key generation and trusted channel to certificate generation application<\/b><\/p>\n |