{"id":349183,"date":"2024-10-20T00:35:18","date_gmt":"2024-10-20T00:35:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/product\/uncategorized\/bs-en-419211-52013\/"},"modified":"2024-10-26T00:14:41","modified_gmt":"2024-10-26T00:14:41","slug":"bs-en-419211-52013","status":"publish","type":"product","link":"https:\/\/pdfstandards.shop\/product\/publishers\/bsi\/bs-en-419211-52013\/","title":{"rendered":"BS EN 419211-5:2013"},"content":{"rendered":"
This European Standard specifies a protection profile for a secure signature creation device that may generate signing keys internally and communicate with the signature creation application in protected manner: secure signature creation device with key generation and trusted communication with signature creation application (SSCD KG TCSCA).<\/p>\n
PDF Pages<\/th>\n | PDF Title<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
4<\/td>\n | Contents Page <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
5<\/td>\n | Foreword <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
6<\/td>\n | Introduction <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
7<\/td>\n | 1 Scope 2 Normative references 3 Conventions and terminology 3.1 Conventions 3.2 Terms and definitions 4 PP introduction 4.1 PP reference <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
8<\/td>\n | 4.2 PP overview 4.3 TOE overview 4.3.1 Operation of the TOE <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
9<\/td>\n | 4.3.2 Target of evaluation <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
10<\/td>\n | 4.3.3 TOE lifecycle 5 Conformance claims 5.1 CC conformance claim 5.2 PP claim, Package claim 5.3 Conformance rationale <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
11<\/td>\n | 5.4 Conformance statement 6 Security problem definition 6.1 Assets, users and threat agents <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
12<\/td>\n | 6.2 Threats 6.3 Organizational security policies 6.4 Assumptions 7 Security objectives 7.1 Security objectives for the TOE 7.1.1 Relation to core PP SSCD KG 7.1.2 OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp Trusted channel of TOE for VAD import <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
13<\/td>\n | 7.1.3 OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp Trusted channel of TOE for DTBS import 7.2 Security objectives for the operational environment 7.2.1 Relation to core PP 7.2.2 OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp Trusted channel of HID for VAD export 7.2.3 OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp Trusted channel of SCA for DTBS export <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
14<\/td>\n | 7.3 Security objectives rationale 7.3.1 Security objectives backtracking Table 1 – Mapping of security problem definition to security objectives <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
15<\/td>\n | 7.3.2 Security objectives sufficiency <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
16<\/td>\n | 8 Extended components definition 9 Security requirements 9.1 Security functional requirements 9.1.1 Use of requirement specifications <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
17<\/td>\n | 9.1.2 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
18<\/td>\n | 9.1.3 FDP_UIT.1\/DTBS Data exchange integrity 9.1.4 FTP_ITC.1\/VAD Inter-TSF trusted channel \u2013 TC Human Interface Device <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
19<\/td>\n | 9.1.5 FTP_ITC.1\/DTBS Inter-TSF trusted channel \u2013 Signature creation Application <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
20<\/td>\n | 9.2 Security assurance requirements Table 2 – Assurance requirements: EAL4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
21<\/td>\n | 9.3 Security requirements rationale 9.3.1 Security requirements coverage Table 3 – Mapping of functional requirements to security objectives for the TOE <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
22<\/td>\n | 9.3.2 TOE security requirements sufficiency <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
23<\/td>\n | 9.3.3 Satisfaction of dependencies of chosen security requirements Table 4 – Satisfaction of dependencies of security functional requirements <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
25<\/td>\n | Table 5 – Satisfaction of dependencies of security assurance requirements 9.3.4 Rationale for chosen security assurance requirements <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
26<\/td>\n | Bibliography <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Protection profiles for secure signature creation device – Extension for device with key generation and trusted channel to signature creation application<\/b><\/p>\n |